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Abstract 
Britain did not release its final two prisoners from the prison it administered in West 
Germany until July 1957, eight years after the formation of the Federal Republic and 
the formal ending of its military rule. By 1949, Germany, once the enemy of 
Europe, assumed greater strategic significance in the minds of western politicians 
seeking its reintegration within a new European family of nations to forestall fears 
of Soviet hegemony, not least because it now wanted to re-arm West Germany. The 
continuing incarceration of German war criminals had become a lesser priority in 
the battleground of Cold War ideologies. The Adenauer government pressurised 
Britain to honour its pledge to review the sentences for the hundreds of detainees 
who remained in custody following the Nuremberg trials. Britain’s moral mandate 
to govern Germany from 1945 was underpinned by its claims to be exporting 
democratic liberal values but, as this article explains, was exposed in its illiberal 
handling of the war criminals issue which ran counter to the new moves towards 
reconciliation.    
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Resumen 
Gran Bretaña no liberó a sus dos últimos  presos de la cárcel que administraba en 
Alemania Occidental hasta julio de 1957, ocho años después de la formación de la 
República Federal y la finalización formal de su gobierno militar. En 1949 
Alemania,  el antaño enemigo de Europa, adquiere una gran importancia estratégica 
en la mente de los políticos occidentales que buscan su reintegración dentro de una 
nueva familia europea de naciones para prevenir los temores de la hegemonía 
soviética, sobre todo porque ahora querían rearmar Alemania Occidental. El 
encarcelamiento continuado de los criminales de guerra alemanes se había 
convertido en una prioridad menor en el campo de batalla de las ideologías de la 
Guerra Fría. El gobierno de Adenauer, fue presionado por Gran Bretaña a cumplir su 
promesa de revisar las sentencias de los cientos de detenidos que permanecían en 
prisión tras los juicios de Nuremberg. El mandato moral de Gran Bretaña para 
gobernar Alemania desde 1945, se apoyó en sus pretensiones de exportar los valores 
liberales democráticos, pero, como en este artículo se explica, fue expuesto en su 
manejo de la guerra liberal criminales cuestión que va en contra de los nuevos 
avances hacia la reconciliación. 
Palabras clave: Alemania occidental, Gran Bretaña, criminales de guerra, justicia, 
reconciliación  
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he historiography on the Western Allies’ occupation of Germany 
from 1945 focuses disproportionately on the first five years of 
reconstruction, material and humanitarian crises and Cold War 
division. Less attention is devoted to continuities in occupation policy during 
the five years after 1949 and their consequential impact on the new West 
German state.  
     Policy on internment, incarceration and detention illuminates one of 
many fundamental problems facing the Federal Republic on its path from 
fascist to sovereign nation. This discussion evaluates whether Allied policy – 
and here the focus is Britain – harmonised with political and social change in 
Germany after 1949. The approach is twofold: first, to explain the changing 
political and social functions of its internment and detention policies, and 
second, to explain the tensions between the British application of justice and 
the Germans’ own sense of fairness. How far did it reconcile punishment for 
crimes with reconciliation, and how was this affected by public opinion? 
Growing controversy in Britain and Germany over perceived failures to 
square these contradictions exacerbated difficult negotiations over 
rearmament and undermined Britain’s justification for its punitive 
sentencing and detention policies, experienced by Germans at the time as a 
form of victor’s justice, and more recently conceptualised as “Nuremberg 
Syndrome” (Zolo, 2009, p. 47).1 The policy became toxic for British 
authorities in Germany and for its government as allegations of worsening 
conditions and prisoner mistreatment leaked publicly in newspaper 
interviews, letters and photographs, not possible in the previously censored 
press.    
     Britain’s occupation policy in Germany from 1945-49 was conceived of 
and presented as its moral mandate (Graham-Dixon, 2010) with many still 
interpreting the birth of the Federal Republic as the occupation’s effective 
demise which drew a line in the sand under British rule. It did not. 
Narratives of recovery from 1945 pain to mid-1950s prosperity underplay 
T 
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the difficult path to the Bonn Treaty in May 1952 and beyond with West 
Germany granted greater sovereignty albeit with many continuing 
restrictions.     
     Major issues remained unresolved in September 1949 becoming sources 
of fresh grievances – ending the state of war, dismantling, demilitarisation 
and limits placed on industry, the bombing and occupation of Heligoland, 
requisitioning of private property, and policy on war crimes trials and 
sentencing. This period is a story of how lingering memories of Germany’s 
past coloured defensive British policies. When Britain’s Control 
Commission left West Germany on May 11 1955, a leading broadsheet 
wrote: “The Germans are not likely to remember with gratitude the Allied 
Military Governments and Control Commissions…. Occupation 
Governments scarcely expect to be popular…. But today’s obituary notice of 
the British occupation will pass unnoticed”.2 This verdict challenges a 
popular British myth of an unalloyed success story, or that its presence in 
Germany was mostly reparative. I suggest rather that we see British rule as a 
form of militant liberalism. By 1949 Britain’s need to heal the diplomatic 
fractures faced new imperatives to restore German sovereignty, revise the 
Occupation Statute with its many reserved powers, and incorporate it as a 
peaceful member of the European community, outlined in the Petersberg 
Agreement between the Western Allies and the Federal Republic in 
November 1949.
3
  
     Anthony Nicholls has shown how Germany and Britain always appear to 
approach closeness but somehow never quite seem able to achieve it.
4
 My 
argument is that Britain’s policy spoke more of a reflex amongst politicians 
and civil servants to retain status and power in Germany over issues that it 
was reluctant to relinquish jurisdiction, although we know that foreign 
policy prioritised the Soviet threat, the relationship with the United States, 
Commonwealth trade and Empire over Europe (Nicholls, 2005).This 
reflected as much Britain’s reluctance to face up to its diminishing global 
power status as a determination to protect West Germany’s democratic base 
from the threat to Western interests of Soviet expansionism. Problems did 
not evaporate merely because a military government regime was replaced in 
1949 by a new High Commission. Superficially this structural shift between 
occupier and occupied suggested a new relaxation of policy. But many West 
Germans viewed this transition as less clear-cut. Headlines like “Between 
War and Peace” captured the prevailing mood. With new threats to global 
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stability such as in Korea, a new dialogue was needed to heal old wounds to 
help West Germany’s growth as a secure, stable and prosperous society. 
Potsdam failed to draw a line under six years of conflict, freezing prospects 
of a thaw in British-German relations. Debates over West German 
rearmament and its role in a European Defence Community re-exposed 
British fear and mistrust that conflicted with Bonn’s hopes for sovereign 
status with outstanding issues, such as ending German war crimes trials, 
settled in a peace treaty.   
     The attenuated legal and political processes that delayed the Federal 
Republic’s sovereignty for so many years in many ways symbolised the 
problems continuing to compromise Anglo-German relations after 1949. 
Many residual tensions over relinquishing power and control were 
psychologically ingrained. This was highly relevant to the German war 
criminals question.   
     The Western Allies met on 4
th
 July 1950 to consider revising the 1949 
Occupation Statute and make recommendations for ending the state of war 
with Germany to the Foreign Ministers’ September meeting in New York, 
and to reach consensus on giving Bonn more control over its foreign 
relations. Greater sovereignty would profoundly alter its legal relationship 
with the occupying powers, necessitating the Statute’s revision.5 Lawyers 
had to remove “inconvenient anomalies” without “undermining in any way 
the basis of the occupation and the Allies’ right to retain necessary 
controls”.6 Britain distinguished between the persistence of a state of war in 
its domestic law and “the actual state” of relations with Germany.7 France 
thought war should be considered ended on 8 May 1945 when the Nazi state 
surrendered unconditionally, therefore ceasing to exist. “Will the state of 
war be ended?” asked one leading newspaper.8 For a further year from July 
1950 many repeated this refrain. While the Western Allies sought unanimity 
German newspapers grew tired of symbolic “peace” declarations, refocusing 
their fire on how laws effective from May 1945 were now “outdated” in 
democratic politics with other issues unresolved such as rights legislation, 
frontiers and reparations.
9
 
     From West Germany’s perspective, a formal end to hostilities, sought 
since September 1949,
10
 was psychologically more important than 
recognition of its Foreign Ministry, described as the “small revision” or 
“small step” of 6 March 1951 that permitted it to conduct a foreign policy.11 
According to another more liberal newspaper, when Holland ended formal 
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hostilities in May 1951 this showed that the Germans were no longer classed 
as the enemy.
12
 Bonn recognised the significance of altering its relationship 
with the occupiers as a step to normalising political relationships,
13
 
liberalising economic controls such as freedom to engage in a profession,
14
 
or lifting property controls. However, the British government reserved “a 
great many rights over former enemy property” that only a fully-ratified 
peace treaty could rescind.
15
 It was little surprise that Foreign Secretary 
Herbert Morrison after seeing Adenauer in Bonn glossed over these details 
as a “friendly understanding”. The German press, however, expected no 
meaningful outcome from such visits. Their conclusion was realistic for 
Morrison’s real interest was to find a basis for greater equality “as an 
important and active partner in Europe”16, diplomatic code for seeking West 
Germany’s contribution of armed forces to a collective defence system. This 
was problematic given a precarious economy with manufacturing and 
trading restrictions in force, the ambivalent views of British politicians
17
 and 
church leaders reinforced by SPD and Evangelical Church
18
 fears of 
renascent militarism. 
     Significantly, Morrison was also silent on possible sentence revisions for 
war criminals, According to information relayed to the Foreign Ministry 
from a prominent Hamburg lawyer just before the Bonn meeting with 
Adenauer, the British government’s view was that revision was “a welcome 
way out of the embarrassing position in which they would find themselves if 
the Adenauer government took charge over the completion of custodial 
sentences”. In his view, if Britain decided on sentence reductions as the 
Americans already had done, this would precipitate the resolution of most 
cases by the end of 1951. Moreover, agreeing to “the possibility of a 
compromise would not cost the English any prestige”.19    
     Alongside British ambivalence over rearmament was its lukewarm 
commitment to Europe. Morrison’s predecessor Ernest Bevin, never 
Germany’s biggest cheerleader, did not respond positively to Churchill’s 
demand that West Germany be admitted to the Council of Europe, and 
rejected British participation in the Schuman Plan to integrate its coal and 
steel resources, reinforcing Konrad Adenauer’s antipathy towards the 
Labour government. This explains tepid press reaction that ending its enemy 
status did not deliver the far bigger prize of a peace treaty.
20
 Although on 9 
July 1951 the Western Allies among 50 states declared war “over in 
practice” in a juridical sense, full peace terms were not on the table.21 Some 
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re-emphasised the psychological boost “since yesterday the British 
occupation soldiers no longer see us as enemies…”22 Others, such as Vice-
Chancellor Franz Blücher, sensed the moment was ripe to revisit a 
contentious issue on which this declaration was conspicuously silent - an 
amnesty for certain German war criminals in British-administered gaols.
23
 
This pointed to a continuation of Britain’s cautiously pragmatic policy, and 
forestalled decisive action over reviewing the judgements against German 
military personnel imprisoned for war crimes. 
 
Politicising justice 
 
Arriving in Bonn in 1950, Britain’s new High Commissioner, Sir Ivone 
Kirkpatrick, in a post that for many Germans symbolised the end of 
occupation by an increasingly resented military government, said that his 
two foremost aims were to bring Germany into the comity of nations as soon 
as possible, and “to eliminate all causes of Anglo-German friction” whilst 
defending British legitimate interests (Kirkpatrick, 1959, p. 220). High 
among his priorities were the continuing war crimes trials five years after the 
end of hostilities. What Kirkpatrick did not mention was the growing 
disquiet in Germany, and later in Britain, over the prolonged incarceration of 
German nationals in the military prison administered by Britain at Werl, east 
of Dortmund. Little attention has focused on how the judgements against 
many less high-profile prisoners and delays in the sentence review process 
contradicted British liberal democratic values, a reputation tarnished from 
German perspectives, for example, by intransigence over dismantling of 
much of its industrial infrastructure and abdicating responsibility for the 
refugee and expellee issue. 
       The policy on the treatment of detainees re-exposes this shadow side to 
British claims of even-handed justice and fairness in the treatment of 
German internees. Many of the original judgements were challenged by the 
new German government as evidence emerged of clear breaches of due 
process. Following his summer 1950 announcement of comprehensive 
sentence reviews for Germans indicted for war crimes, and responding to 
calls for a full amnesty sought by German authorities, the High 
Commissioner prevaricated over implementation, concerned more with 
protecting British legitimate interests. Meanwhile the Germans demanded 
the immediate release of prisoners who objectively could no longer be 
216 Francis Graham-Dixon -British Justice in Western Germany 
 
 
considered a threat to British interests due to age, infirmity or a combination 
of the two. Further tensions surfaced as delays in implementing policy 
conflicted with the West’s goal of reintegrating western Germany as an 
equal European partner. Britain was slower to release prisoners than its 
Western Allies. Germany’s new Foreign and Justice Ministries enlisted the 
Evangelical Lutheran and Catholic Churches to make an official approach to 
Winston Churchill, returned to office in 1951, for a full pardon for those 
remaining in custody. The new Prime Minister wanted a “dignified and 
satisfactory solution” to this long-standing grievance, but honour had to be 
satisfied on both sides. Certainly Britain could not be seen to lose face on the 
world stage. Maintaining honour and “prestige” had long been a hallmark of 
British rule.            
     Influential British legislators such as Hartley Shawcross, Britain’s Chief 
Prosecutor at Nuremberg and former Labour’s Attorney-General later 
claimed Communists and opponents of British rearmament were exploiting 
this issue for their own ends. There was an inherent tension between review 
opponents such as Shawcross who was determined to protect the credibility 
of the original verdicts, and other well-qualified observers such as Basil 
Liddell Hart whose moral perspective was more in tune with Realpolitik , 
namely Britain’s need to re-think policy on this issue: “For our good name 
and influence for good, it is essential that we should clearly show that we are 
striving to be just, not vindictive”.24 A transparent, swift sentence review 
process would have enabled Britain to make good its pledges and maintain 
global prestige. The opposite occurred. This is odd as historians generally 
accept the Western Allies and Soviets were more interested in prosecuting 
crimes against their own military than crimes against humanity (Heberer & 
Matthäus, 2008) yet many still in British custody were indicted from 1947 
for crimes against humanity. Kirkpatrick’s announcement of comprehensive 
sentence reviews prompted sustained press speculation until 1954 of an 
amnesty 
25
 for internees. Some remained under sentence of death which 
public opinion could not accept as the Basic Law abolished capital 
punishment in German courts.
26
  
     Proceedings against less high-profile prisoners, such as military 
chauffeurs indicted for conspiracy, called into doubt the reliability of 
judgements. Evangelical Church documents on the planned reviews cite 
breaches of due process by British military courts with defendants given at 
most a few days, sometimes only hours to prepare their written trial defence. 
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All charges were in English with no German translation for the accused, 
with trials conducted in English and no written or verbal reasons given for 
judgements. Moreover in April 1951 it was announced that arrest without 
legal warrant, and internment without trial in a “secret prison” of those 
suspected of espionage “or other activity directed against the British forces 
of occupation” would continue.27 By 1952 many had not received a written 
summary of their judgements.
28
 Denying internees rights of Habeas Corpus 
using security exigencies to detain suspects without charge in Britain and the 
United States over 60 years later on the pretext of extremist views or 
terrorism has a prescient antecedent.  
     The Evangelical Church (EKD), represented by Martin Niemöller, was 
worried about “rights abuses” against prisoners. Their Foreign Department 
proposed writing to the Bishop of Sheffield stressing such abuses
29
 in liaison 
with the Justice Ministry’s early 1952 initiative to approach Churchill 
directly. Niemöller alerted a receptive British Council of Churches to the 
problems in December 1950.
30
 Nine months earlier an International Red 
Cross paper accentuated prisoner’s rights under the 1929 Geneva 
Convention. The Justice Ministry was keen for allegations not to be traced to 
its document “so as not to lose the initiative in these matters.”31 With 
denazification not producing any substantive sentence reviews by 1952, 
clergymen like Hannover’s Landesbischof Lilje hoped to dovetail these 
concerns with Allied talks on the Occupation Statute and Germany’s role in 
Western Europe’s defence.32   
     Anticipating the gravity of the rearmament issue in spring 1950, 
Adenauer unambiguously articulated two pre-conditions for talks, “cessation 
of the defamation of the German soldier and a satisfactory settlement of 
sentences for war crimes”. However it took over nine months to begin the 
sentence reviews. The High Commissioner’s delay in implementation was 
well timed as NATO foreign ministers were due to agree proposals in 
December on Germany’s financial contribution to defence (Bloxham, 2001, 
p. 167). Kirkpatrick informed Adenauer in November that 240 German 
nationals were held in Werl with around 160 sentenced for murder or 
maltreatment of Allied nationals and POWs in concentration camps.
33
 He 
claimed all cases were re-examined the previous year, 66 resulting in 
reduced sentences and 28 in release.
34
 Promising another “comprehensive 
review”35 during 1951 his pledge significantly precluded reviewing any of 
the actual judgements. Perversely, the January 1949 first review was 
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considered “final…no further reviews except under exceptional 
circumstances” (Bloxham, 2001). One year later Britain agreed to an 
amnesty for those aged over 65 and unfit for imprisonment, and to introduce 
a parole system.
36
 But this concession was on Germany initiatives. 
     The Justice Ministry wanted Britain to adopt an “integrated and active” 
amnesty policy in line with the other Western powers. It sought legal 
distinction between those cleared by denazification and other criminals in 
custody, and a new committee to examine rights of public officials not 
convicted of any crime and who without this clarification were guilty under 
new German law.
37
 The EKD Hilfswerk tried to interpret the legal 
complexities of Allied Control Council Law No. 10 regarding war crimes 
sentencing and members of criminal organisations. It had to be well briefed 
on legal minutiae if efforts to secure at least better prison conditions were to 
succeed. To be taken seriously by the British government needed more than 
polemics on a duty of care and Christian conscience invoked most notably in 
Britain by Victor Gollancz and George Bell. 
     In September 1951, 37 Hamburg lawyers representing prisoners 
petitioned the Justice Ministry, aware that Bonn considered some inmates 
unjustly indicted. Inter-departmental correspondence pointedly labelled them 
as “German political prisoners in Werl” or “so-called German war 
criminals”.38 A leading lawyer lobbied Adenauer who replied that only 
“general issues” were discussed on his short London visit.39 German 
newspaper headlines, previously optimistic, shifted to critiques of British 
obfuscation, delayed justice and failure to observe internees’ fundamental 
rights.
40
 Wider scepticism over the verdicts and prison treatment was at the 
heart of anger at the decision to review only sentences. Stung by newspaper 
criticisms of a new, tougher prison regime with arbitrary limits recently 
imposed on Christmas parcels and prisoners tobacco
41
 sure to inflame 
resentments, Kirkpatrick rebuked Adenauer:  
 
             I have no doubt that you were unaware that such statements were 
being published on behalf of your Government and that in the light 
of your conversations in London with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden 
you will deprecate the public exchange of official recriminations on 
this delicate topic. Our purpose, as Mr. Churchill explained to you, 
is to find a dignified and satisfactory solution. But our intentions 
are likely to be frustrated if these polemics continue…I am 
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refraining from any detailed reply to these statements, some of 
which I can prove to be inaccurate, and I sincerely hope that you 
will take steps to prevent any repetition.
42  
    
  
     The German press jumped on this dressing-down of the Chancellor: 
“Kirkpatrick protests against anti-British propaganda.”43 Just as relevant was 
how a private letter had been leaked into the public domain. Betraying the 
High Commissioner’s discomfort at the politicisation of this issue only 
fuelled speculation among German politicians and the public already 
impatiently anticipating his sentence review announcement, and statements 
by the DP,
44
 FDP,
45
 and leading church figures. All regarded any review as a 
new standard of more even-handed justice. Württemberg’s Evangelical 
Bishop Theophil Wurm commented publicly on General von Manstein’s 
situation in summer 1950, then in June 1952 wrote an open letter to 
Churchill arguing the “remains of the spirit of Nuremberg must now be put 
to rest”.46 Six months earlier he was approached by the Association of 
Returnees, Prisoners of War and Relatives of Missing Persons (VdH) to do 
all he could to improve conditions in Werl.
47
 Cardinal Frings met 
Kirkpatrick, a fellow Catholic,
48
 in November 1950,
49
 and as part of the 
Justice Department and Foreign Ministry’s campaign to use the churches to 
lobby Churchill for a pardon by Christmas 1951, was requested by the EKD 
to make corresponding representations.
50
 Bishop Dibelius of Berlin 
reminded Churchill of Kirkpatrick’s announcement in January 1951 that 
there was no man in prison for war crimes whose sentence he “would not be 
prepared to review in view of the changed circumstances” with no decision 
yet reached on petition submissions by 210 German nationals. He wanted 
time served prior to sentencing to be included as was the practice in 1947, 
and for Britain to grant Christmas leave to seriously ill prisoners, the elderly 
and very young. British authorities instructed petitions must not include 
statements on the question of guilt. The Germans complied with this.
51
 
     Churchill’s desire for an equitable solution exposed deeper British 
schisms. Kirkpatrick’s pledge to look at all cases caused serious ructions 
within the Labour Cabinet. Shawcross, formerly its Attorney-General until 
April 1951, was perturbed that the “Communists and other opponents” of 
rearmament and critics of British proposals, in his view, were exploiting talk 
of sentence reviews to accuse Britain of “rearmament of the Nazis”. In 
October 1952, intent on ensuring the Nuremberg judgements were not 
220 Francis Graham-Dixon -British Justice in Western Germany 
 
 
compromised, he contentiously referred to any potential reviews as 
“appeasement”.52 Attlee and Bevin quietly took Kirkpatrick to task for 
overreaching his authority in adjudicating on appeals for clemency.
53
 So not 
to reveal any policy split between Downing Street and the High Commission 
this was presented as a “misunderstanding” attributed to off-the-record 
comments at a press lunch – Kirkpatrick’s delegated powers were withdrawn 
in June 1951.
54
 With European defence negotiations in the balance, a new 
Conservative administration needed to salvage embarrassment to British 
prestige, enabling Anthony Eden to shift away from Bevin’s earlier hard-line 
stance. Equally irritating to politicians of both main British parties were 
attempts of Anglicans like Bell, Bishop of Chichester, to sway Labour into 
abandoning its policy.             
 
 This is not a time, [and] nor are the British people a people to keep 
vanquished military leaders and their compatriots in continued 
captivity. It is not the kind of policy which our great soldiers and 
sailors, from the Duke of Wellington onwards, would be likely to 
endorse…The cases of all war criminals now in British custody are, 
we are told under steady review; but we can be too stiff and slow. 
Apart from the exceptional cases… the day has surely come for a 
general amnesty.
55
 
 
     Bell, among few consistent opponents of wartime area bombing, had 
argued for a less punitive occupation policy with public figures such as 
Gollancz, Labour MPs Richard Stokes and Frank Pakenham, former 
Minister for Germany from 1947, later transferred by Attlee to the Ministry 
of Pensions, reward for his “rather too pro-German views”. Most conceded 
that guilty perpetrators of war crimes should be punished, but a reactionary 
mood in Britain demanding justice, even retribution, had moderated by 
1948. Moreover there were critics within the British army.
56
 That the 
original tariffs of eleven Wehrmacht generals and higher-ranking soldiers 
sentenced in May and June 1947 were reduced later suggests British military 
courts may have imposed unreasonably high sentences with reviews 
pragmatically motivated. Not all in government were happy about the 
revisions, ranging from death sentences commuted to ten or 21 years in 
former Field-Marshal Kesselring’s case, eighteen to twelve years for 
Manstein, or for others, from life to 21 or ten years.
57
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      In January 1952, due to persistent damaging headlines, the Justice 
Ministry visited the Werl prisoners to inspect conditions. They advised the 
Foreign Ministry that due to blanket press coverage of its penal system, it 
may be wise “to let matters rest for the moment”58 given ongoing 
negotiations over the Statute and rearmament. This diplomatically stopped 
shy of overtly criticising British policy without dismissing the charges of 
mistreatment fuelled by leaked interviews, letters and photographs that 
evaded prison censorship. The allegations gained credibility after EKD 
Synod President Wilm of Westphalia’s visit, resulting in denials by the High 
Commission’s Legal Adviser, economical in their disclosure as they were 
disingenuous. Attempts to discredit Wilm emboldened his response to 
Kirkpatrick. Yes, he had been allowed access to individual prisoners in a 
separate room should they request an audience. But it was not mentioned 
that any such meetings had to be in a British official’s presence, and so it 
was unsurprising that internees were reluctant to unburden themselves. That 
none accepted the offer of a “human and Christian conversation” was 
designed to infer prisoner contentment with their treatment and conditions in 
captivity more generally. But to Wilm’s knowledge the German authorities 
still had no sentencing documents and state lawyers remained unaware of the 
specific crimes for which they were held. What “shook” him most was the 
British refusal to take a senior clergyman’s word.59 As I said, prestige or 
saving face was central to Britain’s image, which is why they closed ranks.  
     Kesselring sought Adenauer’s approval for a committee of British MPs 
visit Werl “to acquaint themselves with the circumstances relating to war 
criminals,” believing they and the British public were insufficiently 
informed of the full facts over the trials. The Foreign Office blocked his 
letter saying they could not transfer their responsibility for war criminals to 
Bonn and wanted to spare the Chancellor any embarrassment.
 60
 Whitehall 
was concerned not to re-ignite adverse public opinion in both countries as 
debates on Manstein’s age and ill-health had started in 1948 a year before 
his trial. By September 1952, 116 lower-profile prisoners still awaited the 
findings of their reviews
61
 although Kirkpatrick knew West Germany’s 
inclusion as a signatory to the European Defence Community Treaty was 
essential to mollify opinion, and pressure was now on Eden “to finish with 
the war criminals issue for good.” A pretext was found to release the two 
most prominent prisoners by arranging negative medical assessments for 
Manstein with a documented history of eye trouble, and Kesselring to be 
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granted medical parole in order to undergo an exploratory operation for 
cancer (Bloxham, 2001).
62
  
     Hopes that Britain might profit from its magnanimity were dashed by the 
new prison governor, Colonel H.S. Meech, following the escape of a former 
Luftwaffe sergeant and former Wehrmacht private.
63
 Meech was Chief 
Magistrate at the Control Commission summary courts in North Rhine-
Westphalia
64
 from 1945 to 1949 then appointed as Governor of the Allied 
military prison at Spandau before moving to Werl in April 1953.
65
 In 
response to the German police’s “lack of cooperation”66, a failure to hunt 
down and turn in the German escapees, Meech withdrew all prisoners” 
privileges and compassionate leave for long-term inmates. Such a united 
display of German defiance and the disproportionate response it elicited to 
what was construed as collaboration suggested that Britain’s policy was not 
as reconciliatory as claimed, highlighted in an amnesty petition with over 
500,000 signatures from six German Länder.
67
  
     Nearly nine months later, some 100 incarcerated Germans awaited news. 
225 had been released since 1947.
68
 The German press noted that a further 
six months had elapsed since ratification of the European Defence 
Community Treaty in May 1953 and a year since its signing in Bonn without 
any necessary revisions to clear the path for a general amnesty of prisoners 
held by the Western Allies.
69
 Late 1953 saw many reports of a series of 
incidents with clear evidence of a new tightening of punishment measures 
70
 
and deterioration in prison conditions, alleged to have coincided with 
Meech’s arrival. The Foreign Ministry’s measured reaction, contradicted by 
some as no change in prison policy, was that any change in prison governor 
had always provoked internees” discontent.71 However, pressure was 
growing on the British to expedite the amnesty commissions scheduled to 
start 1 October 1953, all the more politically compelling since the Soviets 
six months after Stalin’s death had already released a large number of 
German war criminals.
72
 Tensions grew as it emerged that two prisoners 
recently had made suicide attempts, one, a 63-year old with a serious heart 
condition,  on two separate occasions.
73
  
     Britain’s propaganda counter-offensive swung into action. The chief of 
the British Press, R.W. Crawshaw, set the defensive tone. The Fortschritt 
report, he claimed, did not correspond to facts as the prison doctor had 
explained that only one tried to take his own life and neither attempt was 
serious. He linked the “alleged” stricter regime to the earlier two escapes, 
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claiming that new measures – such as reduction in prison leave on a 
prisoner’s word with such leave only permitted in urgent cases and under 
armed guard – were within normal prison rules.74 Despite reprinting British 
objections to the “slanderous campaign” in certain German newspapers and 
periodicals against the British administration,
75
 Britain’s credibility was 
tainted by a new revelation, an admission by the new High Commissioner, 
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar that the High Commission refused to sanction a 
prison visit by the Vice President of the German Red Cross.
 76
  Others 
maintained that rebuttal of German newspaper allegations was no accident. 
According to an unnamed British High Commission spokesman “this 
campaign of lies” coincided with the scheduled start to the Anglo-German 
amnesty committee’s work. He conceded that rules were stricter for the past 
year due to the two escapes
 77
 prompting further questions whether a new 
disciplinary regime signalled the end for any final amnesty.
78
           
     Adenauer visited Werl soon after Meech’s arrival and introduction of the 
new measures. Britain’s new High Commissioner Sir Frederick Hoyer 
Millar meanwhile played up the advent of “a truly free” and reunited 
Germany. While his comments betrayed greater preoccupation with bigger 
political challenges, and lack of tact over this issue, they did little to 
diminish growing press grumblings over the war criminals question. Another 
headline reflected the febrile atmosphere: “Does he know about the 
conditions in Werl?” Nor in its view was it helpful in present circumstances 
to read Churchill’s unconvincing statement that Germany’s strong 
representation in a new European army placed them once more amongst the 
major world powers.
79
   
     A British Information Services Press Announcement, its irritation barely-
concealed, dismissed all allegations as “abusive articles”, chiefly on dubious 
grounds that no prisoner who had met Hoyer Millar had complained.
80
 The 
High Commissioner remained “convinced” that Meech’s administration was 
both “efficient and just”, occupied looking at ways of improving prisoners’ 
living conditions.
81
 He emphasised that of 80 remaining prisoners, only ten 
were formerly in the Wehrmacht, for example the SS, who had “committed 
to their military duty”. The remaining 70 were former concentration camp 
commandants and camp guards “who either through their personal brutality 
or other abhorrent offences had caused serious suffering and the death of 
hundreds of unfortunate people including children”. Despite these crimes the 
British authorities undertook to review sentences through the establishment 
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of the German/British clemency committee. As to accusations against 
Meech, they insisted that at no time was the “mental, spiritual, welfare or 
legal care of the inmates impaired”.82 The German press dissected these 
detailed counter claims – most contested the denials in the British Press 
Release, some deconstructing verbatim extracts.
83
 For the moment it seemed 
the attempt to discredit and quell the German campaign had succeeded.  
     Meanwhile Britain’s broadsheet press disingenuously claimed that the 
prisoner amnesty campaign was driven by one source.
84
 In reality from 
September 1949 this initiative had gathered momentum in Germany as a 
cross-party issue. Other right-wing parties in opposition to the CDU, such as 
the DP and FDP, supported an amnesty and maintaining the pressure to 
improve prison conditions as a matter of party prestige, and as a way to 
garner support in imminent September 1953 elections.
85
 It is certainly true 
that the more right-wing FDP, in particular, did not conceal its own 
agenda.
86
 Moreover, this distorted the reality diverting attention from 
growing adverse public opinion over delays, in West Germany and Britain. 
Supporting the High Commission response as a “Rebuff for Political 
Propagandists and Uninformed Critics”, the Manchester Guardian conceded: 
 
The pressing nature of the war criminals problem in Western 
Germany, and the fact that the campaign for their immediate release 
is growing daily, has induced the British High Commission to make a 
statement of its case and to explain that everything possible is being 
done to secure a just solution...
87 
 
The “just solution” rhetoric was perverse given that the 1953 release of more 
high-profile prisoners such as Manstein and General Falkenhorst had been a 
transparent calculation by the Western Allies “to pander to the demands of 
nationalistic and militaristic elements in the Federal Republic, in an attempt 
to gain their allegiance” on the rearmament issue (Bloxham, 2001, p. 171).  
      It was only a matter of time before those who sought the truth in the face 
of British insistence that their claims were politically orchestrated drew the 
obvious conclusion as to why prisoners had kept quiet. As we saw from the 
EKD Synod’s testimony, prisoners were inclined to keep their own counsel 
as cell interviews took place in the presence of a British official. With 
widespread reporting of the official British response to the 27 separate 
allegations, military sources who approached them were saying it would be 
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now most “unwise and foolhardy” for detainees to risk further “irritating” 
Meech on this topic. They concluded that Hoyer Millar’s opinion was 
“contestable”, contradicting his assertion that German penal regulations 
operated in all prisons in North Rhine-Westphalia with German prisoners 
subject to Federal jurisdiction. Their evidence, although anecdotal, shows 
that war criminals in practice were subjugated to the jurisdiction of the 
British penal code.
88
      
       Some amnesty supporters interpreted the High Commissioner’s robust 
defending of British actions as the symbolic denial of an administrator not 
“handicapped by the atmosphere of unhappy victors’ justice”.89 Others 
maintained that this leaked information was proof of a stricter captivity 
regime and “outbreaks of despair from some prisoners”, were emanating 
from sources “whose reliability was tried and tested”. In order to reach an 
impartial resolution to this propaganda stalemate and pass accurate 
information to the German public, it was proposed to establish a mixed 
German-English investigative commission led by a neutral power such as 
Sweden or Switzerland.
90
  
     Evidence of a tightening of custodial regulations was further corroborated 
in January 1954 in the statement by “H.G”, a recently released former 
prisoner. Prisoners of war were allowed to undertake paid work usually at 
the daily rate of 10-30 Pfennigs or 50 Pfennig for special duties. Without 
warning, those who had been working in the prison sometimes up to one 
year were removed from their duties without explanation. He also cited the 
withdrawal of a privilege granted to convicted war criminals and Generals 
aged over 60 allowing their cell doors to be open during the day and 
between morning coffee and the start of the working day and during their 
lunch. He named one guard, O’Neill, as “especially spiteful”.91 Four months 
on, with the German-British amnesty commission now looking into the 
individual possibilities for releasing prisoners, only five men and two 
women whose sentences had now expired, had been freed from the 80 still 
incarcerated.
92
    
          In May 1954 the High Commission announced that the war criminals 
had been moved to a separate part of the prison. This was agreed at the Bonn 
conventions two years earlier. However in a masterpiece of understatement 
glossing over long-running acrimony regarding policy, it now conceded that 
new accommodation for the war criminals was “markedly superior” to their 
former quarters, and significantly, that this made it possible to “introduce 
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some modifications in the day-to-day regulations, which the High 
Commission believes should help to improve the prisoners’ morale”. This 
was a very British way of agreeing to reform its regulations without 
admitting that German criticisms and allegations were justified. Furthermore 
the High Commission’s loud protestations of innocence were called into 
doubt when it stated that to ensure that “a satisfactory penal standard is 
maintained”, it had been decided in consultation with the Federal 
Government to introduce annual inspections by the chairman of the prison 
commission in England and Wales accompanied by a senior official 
designated by the German government. Hoyer Millar also announced that he 
would appoint an independent panel of three members entitled to visit Werl 
at any time and to investigate future problems.
93
  
     This announcement, implementation of the Bonn Treaty and the amnesty 
committee recommendations should have ended the controversy. For the 
next nine months Werl did not make headlines until February 1955 when an 
open letter written by one current internee containing further accusations 
against the prison governor was smuggled from the prison. It highlighted 
serial grievances, questioning why the cases of fifteen sergeants and 
lieutenants incarcerated since 1946/7 without a day’s remission of their 
sentences, were less deserving of mercy than those of the former German 
Generals. Another cited an incident following the visit in October 1954 by a 
Commission of the International Red Cross. The next day, one prisoner who 
directed a request directly to the Commission was summoned from the work 
hall to his cell where he was ordered by Meech to undress in front of British 
officials before being subjected to a body, clothing and cell search. No 
reasons were given. Any prisoner receiving a Christmas parcel exceeding the 
10kg maximum weight was asked if they would donate the excess to 
prisoners who had not received parcels or if they would rather have them 
returned to their relatives. All opted for the latter. The letter’s author singled 
out Meech while stressing that the remaining British officials at Werl were 
outraged by Meech’s “methods’, and were “very correct’ in the execution of 
their office.
94
 The anonymity of this source is redolent of a culture of 
pessimism and low morale which the authorities did little to alleviate, and 
only three months before the British took their leave of Germany. The last 
two prisoners were freed in July 1957, Werl closed
95
 and an unedifying 
reminder of ten years of British rule faded into historical obscurity.  
 
HSE – Social and Education History, 2(3) 227 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
All the evidence of the British regime’s conduct towards prisoners at Werl 
from 1949 points to obfuscation and bureaucratic delays in the 
implementation of sentence reviews, causing added stress to the inmates, a 
systemic failure to address prisoners’ concerns about prison conditions either 
through robust denials of wrongdoing, or by deflecting responsibility for the 
grievances on to the Germans themselves whilst justifying prison 
governance.  Prisoner dissent was attributed to political opportunism by 
German right-wing parties. By claiming the higher moral ground, the High 
Commission had little difficulty in convincing the British broadsheet press 
to close ranks behind a regime that never managed to shake off negative 
publicity.       
The more publicised and politicised the war criminals issue became after 
1950, the more German perceptions hardened towards injustices in Britain’s 
internment and detention policies, despite the eventual instigation of 
sentence reviews, annual inspections and a neutral prison investigative 
panel.  
Eliminating all causes of Anglo-German friction “whilst resolutely 
defending our legitimate interests”, as Kirkpatrick put it, was unsustainable. 
In January 1952 he claimed there was no difference that had not been 
settled.
96
 Germans saw it differently. The war criminals issue dogged Britain 
until 1955 as did the legacies of Heligoland, requisitioning, dismantling and 
the cartel policy.
97
 Continuing restrictions damaged industry due to the need 
to refinance dismantled and destroyed plant crucial to West German 
recovery, and impinged on citizens’ democratic rights. Although some say 
the ends justified the means, early British successes in transforming 
Germany’s police, restoring an independent judiciary, creating a responsible 
trade union movement (Annan, 1995, p. 158) and delegating parliamentary 
democracy
 
were not capitalised upon.      
Britain’s policy thinking in 1944 was to govern by “indirect rule”. 
Prolonging its direct jurisdiction after 1949 compromised the democratic 
values it wanted to inculcate in Germans and fuelled fresh resentments, 
while cautious, sometimes illiberal policies and “the inflexibility of 
bureaucracy” (Kirkpatrick, 1959) 98 dampened German optimism. Efforts to 
win hearts and minds were thwarted by the “elephantine memories”99 of 
Germans with experience of ten years of occupation. Moreover, since the 
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start of the Cold War Britain’s foreign policy and economic priorities 
compromised its relations with Bonn, compounded by the primacy both 
attached to their respective relationships with America and Germany’s aim 
to secure equal status with France (Nicholls, 2005, pp. 26-27). After 1949, as 
these old grievances festered, Britain struggled to reconcile itself to this 
vision of equality. 
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